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Swedes in Barbary Captivity: The Political Culture 
of Human Security, Circa 1660-1760 
Joachim Östlund  
Abstract: »Schweden in Gefangenschaft der Barbaresken: Die politische Kul-
tur humaner Sicherheit, circa 1660-1760«. This article aims to present a spe-
cific form of “Human Security” during the Early Modern era. As a case study, 
the relationship between Sweden and the North African states will be put for-
ward. The Swedish maritime expansion in the Mediterranean during the 17th 
century resulted in insecurity for the men who manned the ships when they be-
came targets for Muslim corsairs from North Africa. This article explores how 
the Swedish state responded to the threat towards its seamen during a period of 
100 years (1660-1760). The Kingdom not only reacted militarily or diplomati-
cally towards this threat. Intense attention was also paid to humanitarian as-
pects on the level of the individual. The state tried several preventative meas-
ures to reduce the risk of captivity and installed a nation-wide ransoming 
system. The article highlights the complex relationship between state security 
and human security and shows how cultural values, economy, institutions and 
international politics also give form and substance to the praxis of the “Produc-
tion of Human Security”. 
Keywords: Sweden-North Africa relations, national security, human insecu-
rity, human security, captivity, ransoming. 
Introduction 
The Swedish maritime enterprise in the Mediterranean during the middle of the 
seventeenth century not only resulted in the import of cheap salt but also in 
new politics of security for the men who manned the ships. Muslim corsairs 
operating from the present-day Maghreb states posed a serious danger towards 
the shipping of all European nations in the Mediterranean. The biggest threat 
was their attempts to seize the cargo and carry their crew to the slave markets 
of North Africa. Usually the captives were engaged in hard labor and held for 
ransom. In their letters asking for help and in the writings of eyewitnesses, this 
bondage was described as slavery. The reactions from relatives and authorities 
were intense, and the social anxiety about the captivity of large groups of men 
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resulted in responses unusual for the Early Modern period. The purpose of this 
paper is to discuss humanitarian aspects of the necessary protection of trade. 
The human dimension of security, or the question of security in people’s 
daily lives, emerged in the 1990s as a conceptual response to two changing 
dimensions of the international order, referred to as globalization and the end 
of the Cold War. This shift was defined and explicated in the 1994 UN Human 
Development Report. According to the UNHDR, human security meant “safety 
from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression” and “protections 
from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life”.1 The UN 
identifies seven specific sources of human insecurity: economic, food, health, 
environmental, personal, community and political sources of human insecurity. 
Since then the term has been used in different ways. On the online database 
“Human Security Gateway”, the human security concept is defined separately 
from national security, and where the latter is defined, its focus is on the de-
fending of the physical and political integrity of states from external military 
threats. This distinction is put forward to highlight the fact that the goals of 
national security may in many cases threaten human security: “Ideally, national 
security and human security should be mutually reinforcing.”2 In summary, the 
model of human security consists primarily of four features: its focus on the 
individual, its concern with values of personal safety and freedom, its consid-
eration of indirect threats, and its emphasis on non-coercive means. 
In the following I will show how human security became an important in-
strument in the Swedish maritime expansion. The purpose of this article is to 
trace policies of human security during the period 1660-1760, and to discuss its 
form and substance. The following questions will be highlighted and discussed 
in the article: (a) How did the human aspect of security initially become identi-
fied? (b) In what ways did human security become an organized and institu-
tionalized part of the Swedish state? (c) How is the Swedish policy of human 
security related to political, cultural and historical factors? 
Identifying Human Insecurity 
During the middle of the seventeenth century Swedish economic politics for-
mulated a new interest: to find cheap salt and markets for Swedish staple com-
modities in Southern Europe. The rising salt prices in Setubal and Lisbon 
pushed the Swedish merchants into the Mediterranean, and there they entered a 
world dominated by sea warfare and violence. The struggle for control between 
the two dominant empires of the region, Spain and the Ottoman Empire, re-
sulted in an unstable and insecure environment. During the seventeenth century 
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the conflict transmuted into coastal raids, semi-official privateering and piracy. 
Constantinople’s control over its North African vassals declined and the Bar-
bary Coast became a center of corsairing. On the Christian side, Malta and 
Livorno played similar roles.3 
The insecurity in this area was identified rather quickly when letters from 
captives in North Africa reached the King, state officials or family members in 
Sweden. For example, in 1661 a galley slave in Algiers, Johan Arvidsson, sent 
a letter to the Admiralty about his poor condition. The message was then for-
warded to the Church authorities along with the question of whether they could 
organize alms for a ransom. That was the usual process, and it was repeated in 
many other cases. But Arvidsson’s case was also taken care of by the Lord 
High Admiral Carl Gustaf Wrangel himself when he informed the Council 
about a ransom. Later, alms were collected and the Admiralty also gave money 
to pay the ransom of the galley slave Arvidsson. This example shows that one 
human being mattered and that it was a question of high priority.4 How is it 
possible to understand this response? As Linda Colley has put forward, the 
Barbary captives embodied a particularly dramatic form of vulnerability. Col-
lections on behalf of North African captives seem to have elicited higher levels 
of generosity.5 This might also explain why Swedish subjects even gave alms 
to Greeks who begged for aid in Sweden for their captured family members in 
Turkey. In 1705 alms were collected all over Sweden for captured monks be-
longing to the Greek Catholic Archimandrite at the St. Athanasius Cloister.6 
But ransoming was sometimes lacking, for different reasons. This becomes 
visible in a report about a ransom written by Johan Gabriel Sparwenfeldt to the 
King. Sparwenfeldt was a traveller and researcher who, during a journey in 
North Africa in 1691, had interviewed Swedish captives. In his report he rec-
ommended that a ransom should be paid for “the best, the most functional, the 
youngest and purest Swedes”. Old, damaged and “un-Swedish” bodies should 
not be liberated according to this line of thought. Many of the individuals inter-
viewed by Sparwenfelt had been held in captivity for more than ten years, and 
most of them had been captured on ships from Holland. Because of their Swed-
ish citizenship they had been left behind, according to Sparwenfeldt.7 This was 
also the praxis among the European states: Each state ransomed its own citi-
zens. It is therefore important to emphasize that human security at this stage 
was dependent on citizenship. 
In Sweden, information about what was happening in North Africa was 
fragmented during the second half of the seventeenth century. This can partly 
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be explained by the Protestant Reformation, which ended the contact with 
ransoming organizations that had existed in Catholic European states since the 
thirteenth century, such as the Mercedarians and the Trinitarians. The Church 
of Sweden was indeed active in raising ransoms and publishing the plight of 
Barbary captives, but it lacked the contacts and knowledge of the Catholic 
redemptionist orders in Continental Europe. The basic information came from 
sporadic official contacts, and the letters from captives. Let’s take a closer look 
at the letters – this is where the discourse of security was formulated by the 
victims. 
The letters from captives in North Africa give information about what they 
expected from relatives or authorities at home. What demands were possible? 
Did they beg for help, demand help, or did they even ask when they would be 
helped? When Swedish seamen in bondage wrote letters for help, many of 
them sought aid directly from the King. In a Lutheran society this was a normal 
thing, since the King was not only the head of state but also the head of the 
church. According to the Lutheran state ideology, the sovereign symbolizes the 
Lord – judging, preserving order, and guaranteeing prosperity – and the good 
shepherd who demonstrates virtues, comforts and gives his blessing. This pa-
ternalistic idea of double responsibility was a commonly held norm repeated 
from the middle of the sixteenth century in prayer days, proclamations and 
propaganda in everyday life in Swedish society. According to this line of 
thought, an imagined bond was created between the King and each and every 
individual in the realm.8 This ideology is also reflected in the letters. 
Many letters are signed by five, ten or even fifteen people. The first item is 
typically a salutation to the addressee, and after that there is an explanation of 
the case. Some petitions are broader in scope, giving details about what has 
happened and the problems they are dealing with. All the letters are united by 
their paternalistic subordination in line with Lutheran ideology, the descriptions 
of their misery, and their ambition to evoke benevolence. The detailed descrip-
tion of their misery should be taken seriously, but at the same time, this was 
also a rhetorical strategy used to create an emphatic identification and 
strengthen the will to do honorable deeds. This idea is very distinct in the let-
ters. In many of the early letters compassion with the victim is most important 
argument for aid, but in some cases demands for help are also put forward,  as 
in the following example: 
some of us here gathered in greatest truth, on our bare knees, with buoyant bit-
ter tears of the heart and the eyes, praying and demanding, one more time, for 
Your Royal Highness’ help and liberation.9 
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The next argument is formulated as a direct reflection of the Lutheran ideol-
ogy. This time the King, not his subjects, is addressed and informed of the 
consequences of the deeds which reflect the fundament of the political and 
moral order. The letter says that if the King liberates them, this will be “very 
delightful to God the Almighty”, and therefore, the King’s “great richness 
should not diminish, but by the good God many times be blessed and in-
crease”.10 In a religious world view, this argument should not be taken too 
lightly. The religious view of human security is common to many letters: for 
example, “all this pain to my body does not hurt me as much as their will [for 
me] to give up my religion”.11 This shows what they feared. It is also clear that 
the captives turned the ideological statements back towards the party that rep-
resented them, and even raised demands to be liberated. But what is the mean-
ing of freedom according to the captives? Many captives argue that they want 
to be subjects under a rightful and benevolent king, not a tyrant: “that we one 
more time could return to our dear fatherland with joy and health … and that 
we poor slaves continue to be His Royal Highness’ and our most merciful 
King’s most humble servants.”12 Security, or even freedom, is here defined as 
belonging to the benevolent King. If the King does not help, his legitimacy is 
contested and therefore the messages are composed as a reminder of the moral 
obligation defined by the state. What was the impact of these cries for help? 
Solutions to Human Insecurity 
The Swedish response to corsair activity was not entirely similar to how other 
European states reacted. At an early stage the Swedish state chose negotiation 
instead of “forceful persuasion”, or coercive diplomacy, towards the North 
African states. Swedish ships never participated in any bombings of harbors, 
and even in the beginning of the nineteenth century wars were believed to be 
“an infinitely high price for security”.13 The first attempt by the state to ransom 
Swedish captives was made by Captain Jöns Barkman in 1661, the same year 
that the first letter, from Johan Arvidsson, arrived in Sweden.  His visit and 
contact with the Dey in Algiers was also related in a letter from a large group 
of captives addressed to the Chancellor of the State in 1662. They wrote that 
Barkman had visited them twice, but failed in the negotiation to get them re-
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leased.14 His failure might explain the next reaction from the state: retribution 
by corsairing. In 1663 a secret privateer company was founded by the Queen 
Dowager and a number of councilors. The purpose was to capture Muslim 
ships in the Red Sea. In September one ship out of two reached its destination 
and was successful in taking two richy-laden Muslim vessels. But from the 
investors’ point of view the expedition was not a success.15 This corsair activity 
was an exception, and after this failure, Swedish politics towards the North 
African states changed.  
Among state officials and merchants, the relationship now turned into a 
question of how to implement solutions for human security. Swedish merchants 
met the threat from the corsairs with insurance from companies in Amsterdam. 
Different strategies about “security from the Turk” are also put forward. In a 
legal case from 1666 about such insurance, it was mentioned that seamen were 
skeptical towards this shipping; a merchant wrote in a document that “no sea-
man will sail on that ship because of fear of the Turk.”16 A different kind of 
insurance, or systems of convoying to meet the risk of Turkish captivity, were 
discussed by Swedish merchants during the middle of the seventeenth century, 
and ideas of human security were transformed in this way into an important 
factor for a successful economic enterprise.  
On a state level, different non-coercive strategies towards human insecurity 
were formulated in 1668 when the Board of Trade decided that a peace treaty 
was needed. This had a humanitarian dimension where one of the motives was: 
“so that our subjects can trade under secure conditions”. This response reveals 
an awareness of the importance of the sailors. This was further underlined 
when, in the same year, the Board of Trade took the initiative of a collection of 
alms for the ransoming of captives.17 To accomplish peace with the most pow-
erful state in North Africa, Algiers, the plan was to send the Jewish profes-
sional negotiator, Azeweda from Amsterdam, together with the Swede Eosan-
der. Unfortunately this plan was cancelled because the ship was caught in ice, 
and because of certain political factors. Then a new expedition was planned, to 
be undertaken by Jöns Barkman in 1669. But this initiative was also cancelled 
when a group of powerful politicians objected with the argument that a Swed-
ish peace with Algiers could create irritation in Holland and England.18 Swed-
ish loyalties in European power politics become a hindrance, and the first step 
to a harmonization between state security and human security failed. 
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In 1671 the Swedish seamen in Barbary captivity were officially described 
as a serious problem in a national proclamation in the churches by the Queen 
Regent Hedevig Eleonora. Benevolence towards the seamen in bondage was 
her main argument: Everybody should give alms and show compassion towards 
these poor victims. This was the wish of the Queen Regent, and it was also 
motivated by the duty to love one’s neighbor. This view of the victim shows 
that the individual had a double relationship towards the sovereign: one bound 
to religion, and the other to the fatherland. Therefore the Queen concluded that 
there were two motives for collecting ransom funds for these individuals: to 
save their souls and to secure their bodies.19 This was a rather forceful reaction 
to a problem that was not yet very serious. At the same time, this announ-
cement reflected one of the greatest fears during the second half of the seven-
teenth century: the fear of the Turk. 
In the mid-seventeenth century the salt trade between Sweden and Portugal 
was established, but Swedish merchants did not enter the Mediterranean exten-
sively until the late 1690s.20 It is clear that the Swedish authorities and mer-
chants were well aware of the risks of sailing in Southern waters, and that a 
number of strategies had already been put to the test to reduce the risk. During 
this period no insurance company existed in Sweden, nor was there any official 
organization for dealing with ransoming. The payment of ransoms depended on 
initiatives taken by the captives in their letters as a request, hoping for the 
goodwill of relatives, county governors, the Church, the Admiralty, the King, 
or the Board of Trade. For example, in 1699 the carpenter Jonas Thorson was 
captured by corsairs from Algiers, and in 1707 one of his many letters finally 
reached its destination, his parents in Karlskrona.21 In this letter he told them 
that he had been sold twice on the slave auction, and then asked them for help 
to request a collection of alms for his freedom. His parents took the letter to the 
magistrate and explained the situation. Then the magistrate contacted the 
county governor, who finally sent a letter to the King requesting national 
alms.22 Even former captives took the initiative to collect ransoms: for exam-
ple, Mats “Moor” Börgesson in 1666, who was granted royal permission to 
collect ransom funds (probably for his comrades left behind in North Africa).23 
These examples show that solutions to human insecurity could differ. There 
existed no formal organization to which the captives could send their letters, 
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but as these instances demonstrate, help was given anyway. Because of the 
irregular system, it is quite difficult to give reliable answers about the results of 
the practice of human security. More research is needed in order to estimate 
how many people made it back home during this period. In the beginning of the 
eighteenth century the situation in Swedish society had changed in major ways 
– changes that would affect the outcome of human security in the Southern 
waters. 
The Realization of Human Security 
Following the end of the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, secure trading and 
the economy were of the utmost importance for the bankrupt Swedish state. 
The humanitarian disaster caused by the war and the downfall of Caroline 
absolutism resulted in a changed view of citizenship. This can be seen in the 
constitution of 1720, which, for example, caused Voltaire to declare Sweden to 
be the “the freest land in the world”. Rousseau called the constitution “an ex-
ample of perfection” and Gabriel Bonnot de Mably called it “a masterpiece of 
modern legislation”.24 The disastrous war ended the Swedish era of great power 
and changed the attitude of many politicians. War was now believed to be the 
greatest threat to national security, and therefore economic development be-
came a question of national security. 
With the end of the war, the protection of shipping in the Mediterranean re-
ceived high priority. This can be seen in a couple of decisions. In 1724 the 
Swedish Convoy Office (Konvojkommissariatet) was founded, with the pur-
pose of organizing and securing shipping in Southern Europe. Convoying, 
peace treaties with and consular service in North African states, and the ran-
soming of captured Swedes were now carried out under the umbrella of one 
institution. It was financed with the Extra-Licent, a duty established by mer-
chants in 1723 to be paid on exports and imports.25 And in 1726 a decision was 
made to organize four national collections of alms each year to pay the ransoms 
of Swedes in Barbary captivity. During these years large amounts of money 
were collected through alms in Sweden. The Swedish Parliament also estab-
lished a committee that would be responsible for these funds, the “Algerian 
Fund Office” (Riksens Ständers deputation öfwer det Algiereiska Fond-
wercket). As an example of the monetary sums involved, during the years 
1755-1760 the Swedish state paid 130,000 Riksdaler for ransomed Swedish 
captives in Morocco. This amount is equivalent to approx. 5 million Euros 
today.26 What is important here is that these decisions show how the question 
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of human security was transferred to the state level, and that as a consequence 
the system became professionalized and institutionalized. Of great importance 
is the treaty made between Sweden and Algiers in 1729. This treaty was shaped 
along the lines of other treaties between European states and Algiers, and with 
it a consular service and the system of Algerian passports were established. The 
purpose of the treaty was to ensure trade security and, not least, that of the 
seamen. The Swedish treaty with Algiers also stated that the consul had the 
right to have a priest at the consulate and that Christian slaves had the right to 
attend the sermons. The religious aspect of human security was also followed 
up when Jacob Serenius, a Swedish priest in London, received permission to 
send “forbidden” hymn books to Swedish captives in Algiers and to other sea-
men sailing in these waters.27 State officials were also concerned about captives 
who were held in bondage for longer periods, that “these poor slaves without 
hope of ransoming should take injury to body and soul”.28 
Compared to the political situation during the second half of the seventeenth 
century, when European power politics became a hindrance for a peace treaty 
with Algiers, Sweden gained a powerful ally in the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, namely the Sublime Porte. Together they were united against the 
common enemy, Russia. This, in turn, affected the relationship towards the 
North African states. According to David Gustaf Ankarloo, the Swedish consu-
lar secretary in Algiers (1801-10), the peace treaty with Algiers was struck 
under good conditions thanks to the agency of the Sublime Porte.29 With the 
changing political map, Swedish diplomats could now use the friendship of the 
Sublime Porte. Swedish diplomats too, for example, raised questions about 
security from corsairs from the Ottoman regencies Tunis and Tripoli.30 In 1737 
the Swedish-Turkish economic relations were settled, and later strengthened 
with a treaty of commerce and a military alliance.31 According to the researcher 
Verner Söderberg, the relationship with the Sublime Porte resulted in cheaper 
treaties and tributes compared to countries such as Denmark, France, England 
and Spain.32 
After the treaty with Algiers, treaties were made with Tunis (1736), Tripoli 
(1741) and Morocco in 1763. Another important institution during the middle 
of the eighteenth century was the organization of seamen’s establishments 
(Sjömanshus) in different cities. There are examples of seamen’s wives apply-
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ing for and receiving economic help when their men were enslaved, or worse, 
when they died in captivity. Ransomed seamen could also get economic help.33 
Before the founding of seamen’s establishments, the Convoy Office could also 
give social funds to ransomed slaves.34 With the seamen’s establishments one 
can say that the human security aspect was in some way extended to the fami-
lies of the victims. 
The consuls in different parts of the Mediterranean world also played an im-
portant role for the captives. The duties of the consuls were many. They col-
lected business information, assisted the subjects of their home state in han-
dling contacts with local authorities, and influenced the “protection costs” of 
the home state’s subjects by informing them of risks, and taking measures to 
diminish such risks.35 They also gave a helping hand to individuals during their 
captivity in states with no treaty. The latter is shown in letters by captives and 
in books written by former captives. In Marcus Berg’s book “Description of the 
barbarous slavery in the kingdom of Fez and Morocco” (1757), he portrays the 
help given by the consul in Algiers, George Logie. Berg writes that during their 
visit in Fez the survival of the group was totally dependent on the help that was 
given by George Logie, and according to Berg, Logie also gave them money 
without the permission of the Swedish state. Berg also writes that he met eight 
French captives who told him that they had received money and food from the 
Swedish consul George Logie, but non from the French consul.36 Help from a 
consul is also mentioned in a letter from four Swedish captives in Morocco, but 
this time from Consul Jakob Martin Bellman in Cadiz (the uncle of the famous 
Skald Michael Bellman).37 This contact probably meant a lot to the captives. It 
is also worth mentioning that George Logie is a common reference in a wide 
range of documents concerning the relationship between Sweden and the North 
African states. He was not only one of the most important actors in the politics 
behind peace treaties between Sweden and the North African states but also 
one of the most active agents of human security in his work of ransoming 
Swedes, as well as captives of other nationalities. His work was also well re-
warded by the Swedish King when his service ended in 1758.38 
As has been shown, different agendas were discussed during the seventeenth 
century in dealing with the threat from the Barbary corsairs. This continued 
during the eighteenth century. The question of a Swedish insurance system was 
raised to meet the fear of the Mediterranean waters. Many ship-owners were 
                                                             
33  Stockholms stadsarkiv, Sjömanshuset, Gratialansökningar 1749-1775 E IVa kolon 3, 1750-
1756 E IVa kolon 1. 
34  Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, ang. förskotterade medel för bl.a. underhåll åt 
lösgivna slavar 1732 23.5. City offices vol. 34. 
35  Müller 2004, 20. 
36  Berg 1757, 35. 
37  Riksarkivet Stockholm, Diplomatica Turcica: Bihang Maroccana, vol. 6, 7 May 1760. 
38  Krëuger 1854, 15, 240, 355, 399. 
 158
disappointed with the convoys – they were slow and difficult to organize in an 
adequate way – but were also skeptical of ideas of a Swedish insurance com-
pany: What if only the captain was insured and not the seamen? etc. The im-
portance of this question was also demonstrated when even the government 
demanded an inquiry (1728) from the Board of Trade, the latter also noting the 
dilemma if only the skipper, rather than the whole crew, was covered by the 
insurance.39 These examples speak for themselves: The simple seaman should 
also be protected from the fear and risk of enslavement. 
During the seventeenth century there was not enough capital for the estab-
lishment of a Swedish insurance company, but in 1739 the “Stockholms 
sjöassuranskompani” (“Stockholm sea insurance company”) was established. 
Its purpose was to break the dependence on foreign companies. And, following 
this, a Swedish “slave insurance” was also created in 1745: “Insurance on the 
danger of the Turk and on human life” (“Om Försäkring på Fahra för Turcken 
och på Menniskiors lif”). This insurance was a direct copy of the Hamburg 
Laws, which date from 1731. The Hamburgian “Assekuranz- und Havarie-
Ordnung” (“Insurance and Damage Regulation”) was also copied directly by 
Denmark and Prussia. But this insurance was said to be unpopular in Sweden 
among the foreign companies. Information about the practical use of this insur-
ance is not available yet, but it was probably of no great importance. Still, it is 
an interesting example of how people tried to deal with the fear of captivity and 
human security. The captivity of some hundreds of Swedish seamen, maybe up 
to a thousand in the end, received serious attention. It is noteworthy that the 
insurance makes a reference to the Admiralty’s “Sclav-Cassa” (slave fund). 
The term “Slaf-Cassa” is also used by the famous economist Anders Berch in 
one of his books (1747). According to him, the security for shipping in the 
Mediterranean was dependent on convoys and treaties. He also wrote that for 
the seamen there should also be “Slaf-Cassor” when peace was not possible 
with the corsairs, so that they would not fear sailing in the Southern waters.40 
This term refers to the existing institutions, Sklavenkassen, in Copenhagen, 
Lübeck and Hamburg.41 The praxis was the same, but in Sweden the Konvoj-
kommissariatet was the central institution for both ransoming and protection of 
the shipping. 
Previous analysis has shown that the implementation and realization of hu-
man security was related to different historical, political and cultural factors. In 
the following the analysis will highlight how the legal status of human security 
could differ in relation to the different political and cultural contexts during the 
beginning of the eighteenth century. 
                                                             
39  Söderberg 1935, 148-150. 
40  Berch 1747, 323. 
41  Ressel 2010. This volume. 
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The Political Culture of Human Security 
As already mentioned, the European praxis of ransoming was that every state 
was only responsible for its own subjects. Human security was in this sense 
limited to citizenship. Other limitations were set by cultural differences. This 
becomes clear if we compare European treaties regarding prisoners of war with 
the European peace treaties with the North African states. The praxis among 
Christian nations of not enslaving prisoners, or civilians, can be seen in an 
agreement between Sweden and Denmark from 1719. The treatment of the 
prisoners is regulated in detail. A prisoner of war should be held captive for a 
maximum of three weeks; he should be treated well and with compassion; he 
should not be put into any hostile prisons nor forced into any labour, and fi-
nally, the wounded or sick have the right to treatment and medicine so that they 
can be ransomed in good health.42 But in relation to non-Christian societies, 
these types of agreement were in general not considered applicable in Western 
Europe.43 The same can be said of the perspective from the other side. In the 
Swedish treaty with Algiers in 1729, the power relationship becomes clear if 
we look at the regulations for the captives. According to the treaty no Swedish 
subjects should be harmed or tortured, and no Swedish subject should be en-
slaved. If a slave flees to a Swedish warship, this person should be taken back 
(not according to the treaty with Tunis – in this case the slave is free). Finally, a 
Swedish subject cannot be forced to ransom a slave, even if the slave is his 
family member, nor can the slave’s owner be forced to sell against his will (the 
deal should be struck with both parties’ consent).44 
From this we can draw the conclusion that human security is related to the 
contact between states, and that the animosity between the Muslim world and 
the Christian world played an important role in how human security was im-
plemented. The legal standards in the Swedish treaty are also related to the 
international standard, where the more powerful states defined the level of 
human security. The stipulation of the lack of obligation to ransom subjects is 
also a blueprint from the English treaty with Algiers of 1682. According to 
Linda Colley this “meanness”, in terms of human security, was partly a func-
tion of the English state’s limited resources at this stage, but also plain mean-
ness.45 The stipulation that the Swedish state, or other European states, was 
under no obligation to ransom its subjects can therefore partly be interpreted as 
a failure of human security, even if the treaty resulted in the ending of kidnap-
ping. It is also important to highlight that the price for upholding the peace with 
                                                             
42  Lunds universitetsbibliotek, Cartel emellan Swerige och Danmark/om Krigs-fångarne slutet 
Stockholm den 30 April/11 Maji Åhr 1719. 
43  Rosas 2005, 48-50. 
44  Lunds universitetsbibliotek, Freds och handels tractat, emellan kongl. maj:t och cronan 
Swerige, och republiqven Alger, afhandlad och sluten i Alger then 5/16 aprilis åhr 1729. 
45  Colley 2002, 53. 
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the North African states was paid not only with gold, but also with large 
amounts of weapons and ammunition. In this sense the European states also 
made it possible for the North African states to continue to threaten their own 
seamen. It was easier to implement human security where the state had a mo-
nopoly of violence, at home. 
The system of human security that was established by the Swedish state had 
strict instructions, especially for the Algerian Sea Passes. In January 1730 the 
“Rules for Algerians Sea Passes” were published. According to the directions, 
an Algerian Sea Pass could only be given to Swedish skippers and to foreigners 
if they had been Swedish burghers for three years. Ship-owners had to swear an 
oath that they were the only owner, and that the pass should only be used on 
the ship at hand. The documents were then sent from the Magistrate to the 
Board of Trade, which then issued a pass. All changes regarding ownership had 
to be reported the Board of Trade. The Sea Pass was restricted to one journey, 
and when the ship got back home the skipper had to restore the pass to the 
Board of Trade within eight days if the harbor was in Stockholm, and in other 
cases within fourteen days to a county governor, who in turn was to restore the 
pass to the Board of Trade. The same strict regulations were given if the ship 
was sold on foreign ground. If somebody falsified or misused a pass on a for-
eign ship, the punishment was death. If a ship-owner gave false information on 
the pass, large sums of money were to be paid in fines. If a ship sailed without 
a sea pass, fines were given, and if a ship was captured without a sea pass, the 
skipper was – if he came back – punished with prison for one month. The fines 
were shared between the informer and the ransom for captured Swedish sub-
jects in Turkey or Barbary. Fines were also given to any shipper who sailed in 
the Mediterranean without the Algerian Sea Pass, because this threatened the 
safety of the crew.46 This clearly shows the importance that was placed on the 
safety of the seamen. The importance of the correct use of the Algerian Sea 
Passes was also discussed among state officials. For example, in a document 
about the security of the Swedish shipping with respect to Algerian cruisers, 
the importance of following the rules given by passes was discussed: “when an 
Algerian galley closes in it should be met with friendship and according to the 
directives”.47 This was a reminder of the directives given in the peace treaty, 
but also a wish to avoid misunderstandings when Swedish ships were in-
spected. 
The strict standards of human security given by the directions of the Alge-
rian Sea Passes were not only meant to protect the seamen from Muslims cor-
sairs but also from “doubtful” merchants engaged in long-distance shipping. 
This new attitude might also explain the diplomatic conflict between Sweden 
                                                             
46  Sandklef 1952, 88-89. 
47  Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, ang. säkerhet för svenska sjöfaranden mot 
algeriska kryssare 1743 6.9. Composite officers vol. 15. 
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and Hamburg. This conflict began in 1731 with a request from the Swedish 
resident at Hamburg, Carl Christoph Stralenheim, to responsible authorities in 
Hamburg. Stralenheim was instructed to act for the ransoming of 10-12 en-
slaved Swedes, left in Algiers, who had been caught while serving on Hamburg 
bottoms.48 This type of request was unusual, maybe unique, between European 
states at this stage, but the request might be explained by the cultural similari-
ties and the long tradition of economic alliances and friendship between Swe-
den and Hamburg.49 The debate, in which the Swedes pushed hard for the secu-
rity of their subjects, can be followed in a numbers of documents in the 
archives to the end of 1746.50 As an aftermath to this diplomatic controversy, 
the King and the Board of Trade officially proclaimed in 1748 that Swedish 
subjects sailing under a foreign flag must ensure their security through the 
responsible shipping company to avoid the risk of becoming enslaved by any of 
the African states.51 This was both a warning and a recommendation from the 
state. Swedish state officials put forward a ransoming request when Swedes 
were captured on Danish ships, which was implemented, and in turn also 
helped Danes in captivity in Morocco.52 In these cases we can see that cultural 
resemblances and contacts had a positive effect on human security. It is there-
fore important to keep in mind that cultural values and contact between states 
also gave form and substance to the political process of human security. 
Conclusion 
Today, human security is described as an emerging paradigm for understanding 
global vulnerabilities. Its proponents challenge the traditional notion of national 
security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual 
rather than the state. It is well known that policies for state security do not 
necessarily include policies for human security. States are in many cases pro-
viders of human insecurity outside as well as inside their own borders. There-
                                                             
48  Hamburger Staatsarchiv 111-1 Senat C1. VII Lit. Ca. Nr. 2, vol. 3, Fasc. 5a, Document 1. 
49  Kellenbenz 1958; Hildebrand 1884. 
50  Riksarkivet Stockholm, Topographic index, Medelhavet ang. tryggandet av sjöfarten i 
Medelhavet samt ang. den s.k. slavkassan i Hamburg m.m. Chancellery office to His Royal 
Majesty 1735 30.1 vol. 23. ang. svenska slavars utlösande i A. Composite offices to His 
Royal Majesty 1738 12.4 vol. 13. ang. den i algeriska slaveriet varande fältskiären 
Hiedenreichs 1740 5.2 Composite offices vol. 14. ang. säkerhet för svenska sjöfaranden 
mot algeriska kryssare 1743 6.9. Composite offices vol. 15. ang. några svenska slavars i A. 
utlösande genom kollekter 1746 6.12. Chancellery office vol. 37. 
51  Publication, angående the swenske siömän utlösen, som under främmande flagg blifwa 
fångne, 20 June 1748. 
52  Landsarkivet Sjælland – EA-001 Sjællands Stift Bispeembde - 1715-1758 Kopibog for 
udgaaede breve vedr. slavekassen - Bind 1734-1745. fol. 235-239. Riksarkivet Stockholm, 
Topographic index. Danmark ang. ur marockansk fångenskap utlösta danska undersåtar. 
Composite offices to His Royal Majesty 1766 1.7, vol. 19a. 
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fore situations where state security and human security are combined are highly 
interesting to study. This article has used the relationship between Sweden and 
the North African states as an example of this.  
This analysis has shown the complex process of human security from 1660-
1760: how human insecurity was identified, how solutions were implemented, 
the realization of human security, and what political and cultural factors af-
fected this process. It is clear that the Swedish security policy was not only 
orientated towards state concerns but definitely also humanitarian and re-
sponded to ordinary people’s needs when dealing with sources of threats. An 
interesting shift in the relationship between Sweden and the North African 
states began around 1720. With the establishment of the Swedish Convoy Of-
fice, the policies of national security and human security started to mutually 
reinforce each other. This was believed to be the most effective tool for the 
Swedish state to accomplish further economic development in the Mediterra-
nean world. The professionalization and institutionalization of the human secu-
rity policy (consulates, consuls, Sea Passes etc.) also made it easier for indi-
viduals such as George Logie to act more freely as agents of human security, 
compared to their predecessors. The difficult practice of human security during 
the Early Modern epoch was partly a function of the state’s limited resources, 
but different historical, political and cultural variables also played an important 
role. The complex working of these factors has been highlighted. The Protes-
tant Reformation, Lutheranism, the outcome of the disastrous Great Northern 
war, and the alliance with the Sublime Porte, were all factors that gave form 
and substance to the praxis of Swedish human security.  In summary, this arti-
cle has shown that cultural, political and historical factors played an important 
role for how human security could be carried out in different parts of Early 
Modern Europe. 
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